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This article analyses the implications for the Latin America region
of the dispute settlement procedure approved in 1994 by the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). These
implications are important because the region has become involved in a
growing number of commercial disputes as its international trade has
increased. The procedure applies to disputes between any of the 148
member countries over matters covered by the Agreement and the 29
multilateral agreements annexed to and forming an integral part of this.
The present article highlights the ways in which the procedure differs
from the old GATT rules and other international dispute settlement
procedures. It describes the agreements that have generated the most
disputes (anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, and
safeguards), discusses United States policy in this area and details the
disputes in which the Latin American countries have participated, with
particular reference to Brazil.
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  At the recommendation of the Government of Chile, the author
has been included in the WTO indicative list of non-governmental
experts. He was a panellist in Canada’s case against the United
States over the provisional countervailing duties applied to softwood
imports and in the case brought by Brazil and other countries against
the European Communities over sugar subsidies.
1 See Jackson (1999, p. 101).
2 In 2004, external trade represented 44% of the region’s GDP (ECLAC,
2004, p. 8, and ECLAC, 1994, p. 39).
Of all international organizations, the most important
for Latin America, in our opinion, is the World Trade
Organization (WTO). One author has described it as the
most economically influential of all the world’ s
international bodies.1
Its importance stems from the macroeconomic
reforms and trade liberalization of the 1980s, which
turned international trade into the main engine of
economic development in the Latin America region, so
that volumes all but trebled in a decade.2 In 1994 the
region’s exports and imports totalled US$ 323 billion,
but by 2004 the figure had risen to US$ 860 billion.
As might be expected, the rise in the volume of world
trade over that period was accompanied by a
corresponding increase in international trade disputes
or differences. These developments explain why the
procedure operated by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) is so crucially important for the region’s
countries.3
This article analyses the implications for the Latin
America region of this WTO procedure or Dispute
Settlement Understanding (referred to hereafter as the
Understanding) and covers the following issues:
historical background and institutional characteristics;
new features and comparison with other procedures;
United States policy; most common disputes; the
experience of the Latin American and Caribbean
countries; the Brazilian experience, and conclusions.
II
Historical background and institutional
characteristics of the WTO
3 The DSB was established by article 2 of the Understanding approved
in Marrakesh at the same time as the WTO was established.
4 Article XXVI of GATT stipulated that it would come into force
upon acceptance by governments named in Annex H whose
territories accounted for 85% of the total external trade of the
territories of those governments. The deadline passed, however,
without this target being met. See Petersmann (1997, vol. II, p. 46).
1. Background
The Bretton Woods Conference of 1946 gave birth to
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the International Trade Organization (ITO). The
roles of these three institutions were to promote
investment for development and to regulate balances
of payments and international trade, respectively. The
creation of the ITO was negotiated by the United
Nations and culminated in the Havana Charter of 1948.
Tariff relief, meanwhile, was regulated by the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, better known
as GATT, whose application and supervision were
assigned to the ITO. The United States Congress,
however, did not adopt the ITO, so that GATT came into
force without this institutional backing. Its
implementation was only ever provisional, moreover,
since it never secured the number of ratifications
required by its charter.4 The gap was filled by a
temporary secretariat created by the United Nations,
which eventually became permanent, and by article
XXV, which established a mechanism enabling the
parties (known as the Contracting Parties when acting
collectively) to meet and execute the Agreement.
Besides these institutional shortcomings, GATT was
born with two major limitations. The first was the
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underrepresentation of developing countries, since
there were only seven of these among the 23 founder
members of GATT. In Latin America, the original
signatories of the Agreement were Brazil, Chile and
Cuba.5
The second limitation was that its work was
confined exclusively to regulating customs tariffs on
goods trade between industrialized countries, on the
basis of the national treatment and most-favoured-
nation principles. Despite these limitations, GATT
managed to survive and endure for almost 50 years.
In its eight negotiating rounds, furthermore, it was able
to adopt decisions, resolutions and protocols that
allowed it to develop and expand its sphere of action,
its representativeness and, very gradually, its
responsibilities towards developing countries.
2. Disputes under GATT
Disputes under GATT during the 1948-1994 period of
the Agreement were governed by its articles XXII and
XXIII which, as will be explained later, remain in
force. These articles established the right of Members
to bring forward consultations or complaints
concerning the application of the Agreement, on the
terms set forth therein. They did not establish a
procedure for handling disputes, however, but gave the
Contracting Parties (and not independent bodies) the
authority to resolve them. Nor was there any appeals
procedure.
In the initial stages, disputes were submitted
directly to the Contracting Parties; subsequently,
resolutions were passed on to working groups of up to
20 delegates or representatives of governments (which
could include those of the parties in dispute), whose
recommendations were submitted to the Contracting
Parties for a final decision. In 1952, panels were
created to resolve complaints under article XXIII and
agreement was reached on the principle that any
measure infringing the agreements adopted would be
presumed to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of the benefits conferred by GATT rules.
Under these new provisions, panel members could no
longer be from the parties in dispute, but their
recommendations continued to be submitted to the
Contracting Parties for a final ruling. Subsequent
resolutions adopted from 1952 onward made good the
lack of a set procedure, culminating in 1989 with the
approval of a new set of rules that were more elaborate
and objective, and that applied until the end of the
Uruguay Round.6
However, the fact that final rulings required
consensus among all Contracting Parties, including the
parties in dispute, mean that disputes were ultimately
resolved through diplomatic or political channels.
During the period from 1948 to 1994, 196 disputes
were resolved but in only one case was authorization
given to suspend concessions owing to a Member’s
non-compliance with its obligations under the
Agreement.7
3. Institutional structure of the WTO
The Uruguay Round was the last GATT negotiating
round before the current and still ongoing Doha Round,
and it was the first to be held in a developing country.
It culminated with the Marrakesh meeting of 15 April
1994 and the approval by the 124 participating
countries and the European Communities8 of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (referred
to hereinafter as the WTO Agreement) and of 29
annexed multilateral agreements, 28 declarations and
ministerial decisions, four plurilateral agreements9 and
an understanding on financial commitments.
The Uruguay Round negotiations took place at a
political and trade ministry level. However, disputes
arising from the application of the resulting agreements
have been and continue to be settled essentially by
legal means, as we explain further on.
Whereas GATT led to a great deal of fragmentation,
since the parties did not all ratify the same agreements
(for example, two thirds of members did not sign up
to the agreements of the 1979 Tokyo Round), the WTO
Agreement and annexed agreements approved in
Marrakesh constitute an integrated blanket agreement
whose texts are equally binding on all Members.10 WTO
5 See the Preamble to GATT 1947 in The Legal Texts, Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (GATT, 1994).
The following citations from the WTO Agreement and its annexed
agreements, all approved at Marrakesh, are taken from that
publication.
6 Decision of the Contracting Parties of GATT dated 12 April 1989,
approving dispute resolution rules and procedures (WTO, 1995, p. 638).
7 See Petersmann (1997, vol. II, p. 46).
8 In WTO usage, the term “European Communities”  is used to refer
to the European Union, particularly in relation to dispute settlement
processes. Accordingly, in this article both terms are used.
9 The four plurilateral trade agreements are only binding on countries
that have ratified them.
10 Article II (2) and (3) of the WTO Agreement.
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rules extend not just to trade in goods and services but
also to subsidies, safeguards, anti-dumping measures,
rules of origin and other issues covered by the 29
agreements mentioned. The WTO is an organization with
an international legal personality (which GATT was not)
and is responsible for supervising the application of the
main agreement and its annexed agreements, including,
of course, the Understanding.11
The 148 member countries are always part of the
three main WTO bodies —the Ministerial Conference,
the General Council and the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB)— and are represented on them. This innovative
structure ensures that the decisions taken by these
bodies will be multilateral and representative:
i) the Ministerial Conference is an assembly of the
ministerial representatives of the Member States.
It meets every two years and has the authority to
settle any matter covered by the multilateral
agreements adopted in Marrakesh;
ii) the General Council is an assembly of the Geneva
representatives accredited by the governments of
the Member States. It discharges the functions of
the Ministerial Conference when the latter is not
meeting. It meets as often as it deems necessary
and administers and supervises the different
Councils established by the Agreement (trade in
services, trade in goods and trade-related aspects
of intellectual property rights),12 and it also acts
as the Dispute Settlement Body when required;
iii) The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is composed
of the same representatives as the General
Council. It administers the rules and procedures
of the Understanding and settles disagreements
arising from the application of the multilateral
agreements covered. As mentioned above, its
functions are performed by the General Council.
It meets monthly, and may have its own chairman
and approve such rules as it needs to carry out its
functions;13 and
iv) a Secretariat headed by a Director-General who
is appointed by the Ministerial Conference and in
turn appoints a staff which he then heads and
whose duties and conditions of service he
determines. Both the Director-General and the
Secretariat staff are international officials and do
not accept instructions from any government.14
At meetings of the Ministerial Conference and
General Council, each member has one vote. The WTO
continues the GATT practice of decision-making by
consensus, which is deemed to have been reached
when no Member present at the meeting where the
decision is taken formally opposes it. Thus, an absence
or abstention does not block consensus. If consensus
is not reached, the decisions of the Ministerial
Conference and Council are taken by majority vote,
unless otherwise provided.15 The exception to this are
the rulings of the DSB, which can only be adopted by
consensus.16
11 See articles VIII and III of the WTO Agreement.
12 See article IV (5) of the WTO Agreement.
III
The WTO dispute settlement procedure
Some novel features of the WTO dispute settlement
procedure, which set it apart from any other
international procedure of the same kind and account
for its efficiency and effectiveness, are the compulsory
and exclusive nature of its jurisdiction, its multilateral
character, its automaticity, the primacy of law in
dispute settlement, the preference for non-contentious
solutions, low cost, speed and the procedures for
enforcing and implementing resolutions.
13 See article IV (3) of the WTO Agreement.
14 See article VI of the WTO Agreement.
15 See article IX (1) of the WTO Agreement.
16 See article 2 (4) of the Understanding.
1. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the WTO is compulsory, exclusive
and multilateral.
Any Member country which considers that
another Member has violated its obligations under the
WTO Agreement or an annexed agreement, or that its
benefits have been impaired or nullified, is entitled to
initiate the dispute settlement procedure by requesting
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consultations.17 In certain cases, a Member with a
substantial trade interest may (if the consulting
Member agrees) be joined in the consultations18 and
subsequent proceedings.
The Member to which the request for
consultations is addressed is obliged to respond and
cannot challenge this jurisdiction (as may happen with
other bodies), since it automatically accepted it by
ratifying the WTO Agreement and annexed multilateral
agreements. This is in contrast to the proceedings of
other international tribunals, where challenges to
jurisdiction and the like are common and can delay or
hold up any settlement of the substance of a dispute
for years.
Jurisdiction is also exclusive in the sense that any
infringement of WTO agreements can only be judged or
remedied in accordance with WTO rules and
procedures.19 A Member country cannot sue another or
seek reparations for such infringements before any
jurisdiction or through any proceedings, national or
international, other than those established by the WTO
system and Understanding.
Furthermore, the procedure is multilateral in a
twofold sense. First, because once an agreement has
been violated or challenged, the affected party cannot
respond with unilateral measures without also
committing an infraction. Its only legitimate recourse
is to work through the multilateral procedures of the
WTO. Second, because each stage in the procedure has
to be approved by the DSB, which is composed of
representatives from all WTO Members. Thus, for
example, the start of consultations, the formation of a
panel and its ruling, a ruling by the Standing Appellate
Body (hereinafter the Appellate Body) or a resolution
approving the suspension of concessions or obligations
all have to be approved by the DSB. Furthermore, once
the procedure has been initiated, any settlement arrived
at by mutual agreement between the parties has to be
consistent with the WTO Agreement and its annexed
agreements, and be notified to the DSB and the relevant
Committees. This allows other Members to raise
concerns about the consequences this bilateral solution
might have for the multilateral agreements
concerned.20
2. Dispute settlement: primacy of law. Description
of the bodies involved
A radical change from GATT has been the replacement
of procedures where political and diplomatic
considerations prevailed by one whereby disputes are
settled by independent tribunals pursuant to the facts
and the relevant law.
The governing law is the set of agreements
annexed to the WTO Agreement and forming an integral
part of it. GATT 1994 is one of these annexed
agreements, and itself includes GATT 1947 and the
decisions, procedures and customary practices of its
Contracting Parties.21
Panels are formed at the request of the
complaining country and must be approved by the DSB,
unless the latter decides by consensus not to establish
a panel.22 They are composed of three well-qualified
independent governmental and/or non-governmental
individuals who cannot be citizens of the parties to the
dispute or of third countries involved in the dispute and
having a substantial interest in it, unless the parties
agree otherwise.23 Nominations are made by the
Secretariat and may not be opposed except for
compelling reasons.24 If agreement is not reached, the
appointments will be made by the Director-General in
consultation with the Chairman of the DSB.25
Panels shall have the right to seek information of
relevance to the dispute presented from any individual
or organization within the jurisdiction of a Member
country, on the sole proviso that they first inform the
authorities of that country. In turn, Member countries
are legally obliged to provide this and a refusal to do
so may lead the panel to draw inferences unfavourable
to that Member.26
The Appellate Body is to be composed of seven
persons of recognized authority and demonstrated
expertise in law, international trade and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall
be unaffiliated with any government and only three
shall serve on any case, in accordance with a
predetermined rotation.27 They are to be appointed by
the DSB for a four-year term, renewable once, and shall
17 Understanding, article 4 (4).
18 Understanding, article 4 (11).
19 Understanding, article 23 (1) and (2).
20 Understanding, article 3 (6).
21 Article XVI (1) of the WTO Agreement.
22 Understanding, article 6.
23 Understanding, article 8 (1) and (3).
24 Understanding, article 8 (6).
25 Understanding, article 8 (7).
26 Understanding, article 13.
27 Understanding, article 17 (1) and (3).
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be broadly representative of the membership of the
WTO.28 Only the parties may appeal. Third parties which
have notified the DSB of a substantial interest may make
written submissions and be given a hearing.29
The Appellate Body will only consider issues of
law or legal interpretations developed by the panel.30
It is exclusively for the panel to analyse and assess the
facts and evidence. However, it has been determined
that consideration of evidence by a panel is a matter
of law and thus qualifies for Appellate Body review.
Furthermore, it has been argued that GATT, the WTO
Agreement and the annexed agreements are an integral
part of public international law and thus governed by
the general principles of international law.31
Accordingly, the Appellate Body regularly invokes the
rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, particularly article 31.32
The resolutions of panels and the Appellate Body
do not apply the stare decisis principle of Anglo-Saxon
law, whereby courts are obliged to apply the case law
established by previous rulings on the same matters.
WTO panels and the Appellate Body take their decisions
freely on the merit of the facts and the law applicable
in each case. In practice, however, even though they
are not binding, previous rulings are always analysed
and considered thoroughly in every resolution adopted.
They are also a principal source of information for
countries considering whether to submit a claim to the
WTO.
Member countries have to ensure that their laws,
regulations and administrative procedures are
consistent with the obligations accepted under the WTO
Agreement and annexed agreements.33 Members are
entitled to ask that legislation inconsistent with these
(e.g., laws that violate national treatment or the
countervailing duties application procedure) be
amended or repealed. An example of this is the
complaint made by a number of countries, including
Brazil, Mexico and Chile, against the United States for
the so-called Byrd Amendment of 2000 which altered
that country’ s legislation and authorized the direct
payment of countervailing duties to businesses alleging
import subsidization or dumping. The ruling, which
will be discussed later in this article, accepted the
complaint and established that this amendment was
contrary to and incompatible with the provisions of the
Anti-dumping Agreement (AD Agreement), the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement) and GATT 1994.34
Jurisprudence has distinguished, however,
between contrary legislation that is imperative (which
can be protested) and legislation that, while contrary,
is merely optional or discretionary (which cannot).
3. Automaticity or the “negative” or “reverse”
consensus rule
By contrast with the resolutions of GATT bodies, which
required for their validity the consensus of the
Contracting Parties so that just one Member could
prevent a panel from being formed or a ruling from
being adopted or enforced, at the WTO the reverse
consensus rule applies. This means that DSB resolutions
take effect automatically unless there is a consensus
among Members that they should not be adopted. As
is obvious, a Member consensus against the formation
of a panel, the approval of a ruling or the suspension
of concessions has never occurred. With GATT, on the
other hand, it was enough for such resolutions to be
rejected by a single Member for consensus to be
blocked, which in the end meant that the parties had
to negotiate a political solution. This is one of the
innovations accounting for the speed and expeditiousness
of WTO procedures. Thus, when a country requests
consultations or the formation of an arbitration panel,
DSB resolutions for or against take effect immediately,
unless there is a consensus against them. The same is
true of DSB resolutions on the rulings of arbitration
panels35 and the Appellate Body,36 or rulings approving
the suspension of concessions or other obligations
when the respondent party does not comply with the
resolutions of the latter.37 In all these cases, the relevant
resolutions can only be revoked if there is a Member
consensus against their adoption.
28 Understanding, article 17 (2) and (3).
29 Understanding, article 17 (4).
30 Understanding, article 17 (6).
31 Debra Steger cites the opinion of the Appellate Body in the
gasoline case (document WT/DS2/AB/R of 20 May 1996, p. 17),
which states that the provisions of the WTO Agreement establishing
the organization cannot be read in “clinical isolation”  from public
international law (Steger, 2005).
32 Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention states: “A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.”
33 Article XVI (4) of the WTO Agreement.
34 Documents WT/DS217/AB/R and WT/DS234/AB/R and DSB
resolution of 27 January 2003.
35 Understanding, article 6 (1).
36 Understanding, article 16 (4).
37 Understanding, article 22 (6).
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4. Preference for non-contentious solutions
The first objective of the procedure is to find a positive
solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties to the
dispute.38 Accordingly, contentious proceedings cannot
begin right away; instead, the procedure has to start
with a request to the DSB for consultations, and the
Member complained of is obliged to respond. These
consultations are confidential, and only when they fail
can the formation of a panel be requested. Without
prejudice to this, the procedure allows and encourages
the parties, subject to its rules (including notification
to the DSB), to settle their bilateral differences at any
of the subsequent stages.
5. Costs
In comparison with other mechanisms, WTO proceedings
have a low cost. The parties do not pay for
administration, secretarial costs or arbitration fees. All
these costs are met by the Organization out of its
general budget.39
In international disputes, however, legal costs are
the largest item and here too the WTO differs from other
bodies. Since October 2001, the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law has been operating. This Centre is an
independent public international body, with its own
legal personality, which had 37 member countries as
of January 2005 (10 industrialized countries and 27
developing countries). It is based in Geneva and its
function is to provide developing countries with legal
advice on WTO issues, particularly dispute settlement,
at a reasonable cost. Its current Executive Director was
formerly a WTO legal advisor. As of January 2005,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and
Venezuela had received legal advice from the Centre
in some of their disputes before the WTO. In some cases
this advice was provided directly by the Centre, in
others by an outside legal advisor.40
6. Speed
Once consultations have begun there is a very strict
pre-established timetable for the procedure, and
extensions can only be granted by the DSB. In practice,
WTO proceedings are both faster and more flexible than
those of any other international body. The flexibility
comes, among other factors, from the non-contentious
nature of the consultations with which they begin, most
of which end with the parties reaching agreement or
the deadline simply expiring without either of the
parties requesting the formation of a panel.41 It is the
exception, then, for disagreements to persist and be
settled by a panel. Indeed, in some cases the parties
settle their differences by mutual agreement even after
a panel has been constituted.
The timetable is 60 days for the consultations42
and six months for the panel to issue its ruling (or
report when there is no appeal) from the date it is
formed. Unless the DSB grants an extension,43 in no
event may the period between the establishment of the
panel and the distribution of the report to Members by
the DSB exceed nine months, or 12 months when there
is an appeal.44 Should there be an appeal, the ruling
must be distributed within 60 days from the time the
decision to appeal is formally notified.45
Once the ruling has been adopted by the panel or
the Appellate Body, the affected Member must notify
the DSB of its intention to comply with the decisions
adopted. If it does not comply with them immediately,
it must do so within a reasonable time, which in most
cases may not exceed 15 months from the date of the
panel or Appellate Body ruling. If the panel or
Appellate Body has extended the deadlines for issuing
the respective rulings, however, the additional time will
be added to the 15 months with the proviso that the
total period may not exceed 18 months from the said
date, unless the parties agree that there are exceptional
circumstances.46
7. Compliance or execution
If the panel or Appellate Body resolves that the
measure complained of is inconsistent with a covered
agreement, it will recommend that the Member
38 Understanding, article 3 (7).
39 Understanding, article 8 (11).
40 www.acwl.ch.
41 Of the 317 consultations begun between 1 January 1996 and 22
October 2004, only 129 led to the formation of a panel (see WTO,
2004a, p. 43, paragraph 93).
42 Understanding, article 4 (7).
43 If the complainant so requests, the work of the panel may be
suspended for up to 12 months, in which case the deadlines laid
down in the procedure will be extended for the period of this
suspension; if work is suspended for more than 12 months,
however, the functions of the panel will cease. See Understanding,
article 12 (12).
44 Understanding, article 12 (8) and (9) and article 20.
45 Understanding, article 17 (5).
46 Understanding, article 21 (3).
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concerned bring it into conformity with that agreement,
and may suggest how this should be done.47
If there is disagreement over the compliance
measures or their consistency with a covered
agreement, this will be resolved through the same
procedure, ideally by the original panel and within 90
days from when the matter is brought before it.48 If the
Member affected or prejudiced by the report does not
comply with the agreed measures within a reasonable
time period, that Member will be obliged to negotiate
mutually acceptable compensation if the other party so
requests. Compensation is voluntary, in that the country
may refuse to provide it, in which case concessions
may be suspended indefinitely until it comes into
compliance. Should compensation be granted, it must
be compatible with the relevant agreements.49 If this
has not happened within 20 days following expiration
of the reasonable time period agreed on, any of the
parties that has had recourse to the dispute settlement
procedure may apply to the DSB for the concessions or
other obligations resulting from the covered
agreements to be temporarily suspended in respect of
the Member concerned.50
Suspensions or reprisals will be authorized by the
DSB until such time as the measure declared inconsistent
with the covered agreement has been removed, or the
Member concerned provides a solution to the
nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually
satisfactory solution is reached.51 The Member
concerned may, however, object to the level of
suspension proposed or the procedures followed, in
which case the dispute will be submitted for arbitration
to the original panel if available or, if not, to an
arbitrator appointed by the Director-General.52 The
level of suspension of concessions or other obligations
authorized by the DSB must be equivalent to the level
of nullification or impairment of the agreement that has
been breached.53
In the 10 years that the WTO has been operational,
there have been only six cases in which compliance
with a final Appellate Body ruling has been called into
question and the DSB has had to authorize the
suspension of concessions or other obligations against
the offending member. Three of these six cases
involved Latin American countries, something that is
discussed below.
8. Some shortcomings
One of the shortcomings of the procedure is that it does
not make any provision for precautionary or
provisional measures to assure the outcome of the
dispute for the complainant. Furthermore, the final
rulings of panels or the Appellate Body only apply to
the future and not from the date on which the infraction
complained of occurred.
As for the compensation or suspension of
concessions or other obligations that can be imposed
on an offending Member to enforce DSB resolutions,
these have to be equivalent to the level of nullification
or impairment of the breached agreements.54 The
problem with this requirement of proportionality is that
it has only a minimal impact on an industrialized
country when the complainant is a developing country.
Furthermore, suspending concessions increases the
tariffs applicable to the country being penalized, and
thus raises import prices for consumers in the importing
country. Lastly, perhaps the most serious shortcoming
is that the DSB lacks the power to apply coercive
measures to enforce its decisions. This limitation
contrasts with the regulations governing the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
which give arbitration awards issued in accordance
with the ICSID Convention executive force in all
Member States of that organization.55
9. Comparison with other mechanisms
The WTO has the most efficient dispute settlement
procedure of any international body. It is an objective,
fast, predictable, low-cost procedure or code of rules
which, notwithstanding the limitations referred to,
responds effectively to the needs of developing
countries. Before it existed, a trade complaint made by
a developing country was unlikely to prevail in the
courts of an industrialized country or, during the early
decades, in GATT bodies. The most fundamental change
has been the replacement of a system in which political
47 Understanding, article 19 (1).
48 Understanding, article 21 (5).
49 Understanding, article 22 (1).
50 Understanding, article 22 (2).
51 Understanding, article 22 (8).
52 Understanding, article 22 (6).
53 Understanding, article 22 (4).
54 Understanding, article 22 (4).
55 See article 54 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which gave
rise to ICSID.
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considerations predominated by one administered by
independent bodies with an obligation to apply a legal
statute which recognizes and protects the equality of
all Members’  rights. What this means, as we shall see,
is that any developing country can now bring a
successful claim against an industrialized country for
non-compliance with its WTO obligations.
Two examples, among many, which would have
been impossible under GATT, illustrate the benefits that
the WTO has brought the Latin American countries.
The first was the complaint by Costa Rica
against the United States for its restrictions and
safeguards on textile imports. The Panel accepted the
complaint and ruled that the United States had failed
to show that the Costa Rican exports were causing
serious damage or were a real or present threat to its
domestic industry, and that its restrictions
consequently violated articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. Furthermore, by
failing to give preferential treatment to re-exports
from Costa Rica, the United States measures violated
article 6.6 d) of that Agreement.56
The second was the complaint by Peru against the
European Communities for preventing it from using the
designation “sardines”  for its exports of that fish, on
the grounds that it did not match the European
description; this complaint was accepted by the
Appellate Body. The ruling stated that the European
rules contravened article 2.4 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade and article XVI (4) of the
WTO Agreement, which requires countries to ensure that
their laws, regulations and administrative procedures
conform to the obligations laid down by annexed
agreements like the one mentioned.57
The dynamism and broad jurisdiction of the WTO
procedure set it apart from the procedures of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and ICSID, whose
Administrative Council is headed by the President of
the World Bank, and those operated by GATT until 1995.
The ICJ deals exclusively with disputes between
States, and these may formulate reservations or refuse
to recognize its jurisdiction as binding. The WTO also
administers disputes between States but, unlike the ICJ,
does not allow reservations58 or any challenge to the
jurisdiction of its dispute settlement bodies. The situation
of the ICJ is different as 58 of its members, including four
of the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, have refused to recognize its
jurisdiction as binding.59 Nor has its performance been
particularly impressive. From 1947 to 2004, i.e., in a
period of over 57 years, the ICJ has handed down only
21060 rulings and 25 advisory opinions.
As for ICSID, its jurisdiction is limited to disputes
between any of its 148 Member States and a national
or investor from those States. As of the end of the 2004
financial year, 159 cases had been registered with it
since its creation in October 1966 and 86 had been
concluded or were pending.61
As for GATT, in almost 50 years (from 1948 to
1994) it resolved 196 complaints.62 These figures
should be compared with the 317 consultations
commenced and the 129 panels formed at the WTO in
the eight years from 1996 to 22 October 2004, as
detailed further on.63
56 Document WT/DSB/M/29 and DSB resolution of 25 February 1997.
57 Document DS/231/AB/R and DSB resolution of 26 November
2002.
58 Article XVI (5) of the WTO Agreement.
59 See Petersmann (1997, p. 23).
60 www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm
61 ICSID (2004, p. 4).
62 WTO (1995, pp. 771-787).
63 WTO (2004a, p. 43, paragraph 93).
64 During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States agreed
to repeal section 301 of its 1974 trade law, which authorized
unilateral reprisals against practices by other countries deemed to
restrict or discriminate against United States trade. Reprisals were
taken against Latin American countries under this law in no fewer
than 11 cases. Brazil was one of the countries most affected (see
Husted, 1995, p. 261).
IV
United States policy
The policy of the United States under both GATT and
the WTO has been one of consistent support for free
trade and rejection of unfair practices.64 This policy has
been strongly influenced by the dramatic experience
of the 1930s crisis and the mistaken policies which
triggered it including, among others, the Smoot-
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Hawley Act, a historic example of trade protectionism
of the most primitive kind.65
Notwithstanding all this, some powerful pressure
groups with great political influence have perpetuated
the protection of industries (particularly in agriculture)
that could not have survived in a situation of genuinely
free trade.66 Examples of this include the sugar67 and
cotton industries. Meanwhile, political circumstances
have led governments to adopt measures of protection
for specific industries from time to time. A recent
example of this was the increase in tariffs on steel
imports; this gave rise to a complaint before WTO which
we shall discuss further on.
Although support for free trade is still the rule,
rulings against the United States by the WTO bodies
have given rise, as we shall see, to strong criticism of
the organization’ s procedures and resolutions by
different sectors in the country.
Notwithstanding this, in 1997 a United States
government report gave unconditional backing to WTO
procedures and, specifically, to the consultation
mechanism, stating that “ the new dispute settlement
rules often make it possible for us to enforce WTO
agreements without ever having to reach a panel
decision” . The report went on to back up its conclusion
by citing seven cases that were resolved in this way.68
At the same time, until recently, public opinion
and political sectors in the United States could not
conceive that trade or investment rulings by the
country’s administrative or legal authorities might be
revoked or amended by international tribunals. When
this happens, there is a groundswell of indignation
against what is perceived as unacceptable intervention
in the country’ s sovereignty. This change has been
taking place very gradually, as a result, first, of some
resolutions by the arbitration tribunals set up under the
bilateral free trade agreement of 1987 with Canada,
then of some of the rulings by the tribunals established
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, of
ICSID and, lastly, of the WTO. Some of these experiences
have given rise to hostility against international
jurisdictions that are perceived as inimical to national
sovereignty, and the argument is made that United
States laws should only be interpreted by the country’s
own courts, and not by faceless bureaucrats hidden
away in Geneva. Curiously enough, these reactions and
this defence of sovereignty parallel former experiences
that our region used to have (and still does, but to a
lesser degree) with the International Monetary Fund,
the conditionality of international financial
organizations and the unilateral policies of certain
countries.
The current criticisms were articulated by Ralph
Nader in a discussion of the WTO Agreement when he
argued that “decision-making power now in the hands
of citizens and their elected representatives…would be
seriously constrained by a bureaucracy and a dispute
resolution body located in Geneva, Switzerland that
would operate in secret and without the guarantees of
due process and citizen participation found in domestic
legislative bodies and courts” .69
In response to these reservations, a Senate
resolution of March 2003, known as the “ Dole
proposal” , established a five-member Commission
which will be responsible for reviewing panel and
Appellate Body resolutions that go against the United
States and informing the government of its findings.
Specifically, the Commission will be required to
determine whether these WTO bodies have exceeded
their authority or mandate, increased the obligations or
diminished the rights of the United States under the
Marrakesh Agreement, acted arbitrarily or wilfully or
departed from the provisions of article 17.6 of the AD
Agreement (which gives the resolutions of national
authorities precedence over those of WTO bodies in anti-
dumping investigations).70
A later resolution of the House of Representatives
rejected the Appellate Body ruling that safeguards on
steel imports were not compatible with the WTO
agreements.71 Since then, however, the United States
Government has complied with that ruling.
65 The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 raised the trade tariffs of the
United States to the highest levels in their history. The result was
that foreign trade declined drastically and the depression worsened
(see Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2003).
66 Agricultural support in the countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was estimated at
US$ 350 billion in 2003, with the United States, the European Union
and Japan accounting between them for four fifths of this total (see
OECD, 2004).
67 Protection for the sugar industry would be a stumbling block to
approval of a free trade agreement between the United States and
the Central American countries (see Barrionuevo and Becker, 2005,
p. C1).
68 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Report on Trade
Expansion Priorities, cited by Horlick (1998, p. 685).
69 Testimony by Ralph Nader before the 104th Congress of the
United States in 1994. Cited by Jackson (2003, p. 790).
70 Senate resolution no. 676 of 20 March 2003.
71 House of Representatives resolution no. 445 of 18 November
2003.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 6  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 5
THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE WTO. THE EXPERIENCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN • GONZALO BIGGS
71
A more general criticism was voiced by both
houses of Congress concerning the interpretation of the
Anti-Dumping (AD), Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM) and Safeguards (SG) Agreements. They
advised the President to ensure that the different
measures specified there were observed or applied in
WTO proceedings and argued, among other things, that
article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, which establishes that
the decisions of national jurisdictions take precedence
over those of WTO bodies, applied not only to anti-
dumping investigations but to subsidy and safeguard
investigations as well.72 One author argues, and we
agree, that there is no legal basis for this interpretation.73
These apprehensions are contradicted by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) report of 30 July
2003. According to this, most of the experts consulted,
in both the public and private sectors, considered that
the WTO had not exceeded its authority when applying
the AD Agreement, that all Members were treated alike
and that no new obligations had been imposed and no
rights curtailed. However, the rules on causality and
unforeseen developments as they related to safeguards
were judged to be confused.74
There has also been strong and persistent criticism
from academic and professional circles. One view
which is very widespread, but which is not borne out
by the facts, is that panels have “almost universally
been deciding against the United States for several
years” .75 The GAO report referred to, however, states
that 11 out of 13 complaints by Member countries
concerning the compatibility of different United States
trade laws with WTO rules were rejected and that out
of 21 findings by national authorities in anti-dumping
or subsidy investigations, the number of United States
findings rejected was equivalent to the number of other
countries’  findings rejected.76
A frequent criticism concerns “ judicial activism” ,
or the adoption by WTO bodies of resolutions on matters
that are ambiguous, contradictory or unlegislated, or
that were not agreed in Marrakesh. According to the
critics, panels and the Appellate Body should refrain
from settling matters of this kind and should hand them
over for solution to the political bodies of the WTO.77
These comments have done nothing, however, to
shake the support of successive United States
governments for the WTO, something that has been
manifested in their compliance (albeit after delays and
questionable challenges) with rulings against them, as
well as in other ways. In addition, the United States
has been the largest user of the system. As of May
2005 it had participated as a complainant, respondent
or third party in all but one of the disputes settled by
the Appellate Body.78 This in itself is enough to
demonstrate, in our opinion, the support of the United
States for the WTO.
A quite balanced United States perspective has
been provided by professor John Jackson. He cites two
opinions that, in his view, sum up the current debate.
The first comes from the Democrat leader Tip O’Neill,
who said that “all politics is local” . The second is from
the economist Peter F. Drucker, for whom “ all
economics is international” . In Jackson’ s view,
reconciling these two perceptions is the great challenge
ahead for international trade relations.79
72 Concurrent resolution of the Senate and the House of
Representatives no. 243 of 15 July 2003.
73 Jackson (1999, p. 90).
74 GAO (2003, p. 30).
75 Ragosta, Joneja and Zeldovich (2003, p. 750).
76 GAO (2003, p. 12).
77 Ragosta, Joneja and Zeldovich (2003, p. 751).
78 Smith (2004), cited in Shaffer (2005).
79 Jackson (1999, p. 104).
80 Article II (2) of the WTO Agreement.
V
The most frequent disputes
The most frequent disputes involving the Latin
American countries, whether as complainants or
respondents, have generally concerned the application
of the covered agreements on subsidies and
countervailing measures (SCM), anti-dumping (AD) and
safeguards (SG), and of certain sections of GATT 1994.
These agreements are an integral part of the WTO
Agreement and are binding on all its Members.80 As
it happens, criticism of the resolutions of WTO bodies
by certain sectors in the United States has mainly
been directed, as we shall see, against the way these
three covered agreements have been applied and
interpreted.
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1. Agreement on subsidies and countervailing
measures (SCM)
A subsidy exists when there is a financial contribution
by a government or any public body within the territory
of a Member or there is some form of income or price
support conferring a benefit.81 Prohibited subsidies are
those that are contingent, either solely or as one of
several other conditions, upon export performance (in
law or fact) or upon the use of domestic over imported
goods.82 No Member should cause, through the use of
any such subsidy, injury to the domestic industry of
another Member, or nullification or impairment of
benefits accruing directly to it from GATT 1994
(particularly concessions already bound) or serious
prejudice to its interests.83
Members may only impose countervailing duties
after initiating and concluding an investigation
accrediting the existence, amount and effects of the
alleged subsidy. Investigations must be initiated upon
a written application by a branch of domestic industry
or, exceptionally, by the authority, when this has
sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy, the
injury caused and the causal relationship between the
imports subsidized and the alleged injury.84 By
countervailing duty is meant “a special duty levied for
the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly
or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or
export of any merchandise, as provided for in
paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994” .85
2. The Anti-dumping Agreement (AD Agreement)
The AD Agreement provides that anti-dumping
measures are to be applied under the circumstances laid
down in article VI of GATT 199486 and pursuant to
investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of that Agreement.87 For the
purposes of the Agreement, a product is considered to
be dumped “ i.e. introduced into the commerce of
another country at less than its normal value, if the
export price of the product exported from one country
to another is less than the comparable price, in the
ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country” .88
Much like the SCM Agreement, the AD Agreement
makes the application of countervailing duties
conditional on an investigation first being held by a
national industry or, exceptionally and when the
circumstances justify it, by the authority itself.89
Just hours before the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round, the United States succeeded in inserting a
provision that has been the subject of much
controversy.90 This is article 17.6, which establishes
that panels, in assessing the facts of an AD complaint,
must determine whether the local authorities’
establishment of the facts was proper and whether their
evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective.
If the panel determines that this was the case, the
evaluation shall not be overturned even though the
panel might have reached a different conclusion. In
other words, the assessment of the facts carried out by
the local authorities prevails over that carried out by
the WTO tribunals. This article adds that the panel must
also interpret the relevant provisions of the AD
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. Nonetheless,
if it concludes that the provision concerned admits of
more than one permissible interpretation, it is to prefer
the interpretation that supports the measure adopted by
the local authorities.91
3. The Agreement on Safeguards (SG Agreement)
The SG Agreement governs the application of
safeguard measures provided for by article XIX of GATT
199492 and establishes that a Member may only apply
such measures if that Member has determined, pursuant
to the conditions of the Agreement, that a product is
81 Articles 1.1 and 1.2 of the SCM Agreement.
82 Article 3.1 a) and b) of the SCM Agreement.
83 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement.
84 Articles 10 and 11 of the SCM Agreement.
85 Note 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement. Article VI of GATT
1994 refers to anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties.
86 The circumstances described by article VI of GATT are that a
product introduced into the commerce of another country at less
than its normal value causes or threatens material injury to an
established industry in the territory of a contracting party or
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.
87 Article 1 of the AD Agreement.
88 Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement.
89 Articles 1 and 5 of the AD Agreement.
90 Petersmann (1997, p. 54, note 98).
91 Article 17.6 ii) of the AD Agreement.
92 One of the safeguard measures mentioned in article XIX is as
follows: “ If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect
of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this
Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being
imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly
competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect
of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation
in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.”
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being imported into its territory in such increased
quantities, absolutely or relative to domestic
production, and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry
that produces like or directly competitive products. The
SG Agreement, however, does not mention the
“unforeseen developments”  to which article XIX of
GATT refers as giving rise to excessive imports, and this
has led to controversy as to which provision or
agreement prevails.
Measures may be adopted only after an
investigation by the competent authorities of that
Member following a pre-established public
procedure.93 They shall be applied, moreover, only to
the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury
and to facilitate adjustment,94 and they may not last for
more than four years, unless the period is extended.95
The Agreement established a Committee on Safeguards
under the authority of the Council for Trade in Goods,
which monitors and supervises its application.96
93 Article 3 of the SG Agreement.
94 Article 5 (1) of the SG Agreement.
95 Article 7 (1) of the SG Agreement.
96 Article 13 (1) of the SG Agreement.
97 The figures in this section differ slightly from those given
elsewhere in this document, as the sources are from different periods.
980 WTO (2004a, p. 43, paragraph 93).
990 WTO (2004a, p. 44, paragraph 96).
100 WTO (2004a, p. 44, paragraph 95).
101 WTO (2004a, pp. 34 and 35, paragraph 67).
102 WTO (2004a, p. 35, paragraph 68).
103 WTO (2004a, p. 44, paragraph 97) and Understanding, article 21 (3).
104 See the last paragraph of section III, point 7 above.
VI
The experience of Latin America
and the Caribbean97
Between 1 January 1995 and 22 October 2004, 317
consultations were filed with the WTO, leading to the
formation of 129 panels for 159 disputes.98 These
panels issued 90 rulings, of which 59 were appealed,
so that in 31 cases the parties accepted the panel
findings.99 Of the consultations, 188 ended in mutual
agreement between the parties, or else their differences
were resolved in one way or another and there was no
need to form a panel.
Of these consultations, most involved industrialized
countries, 204 as complainants and 191 as respondents.
Developing countries, meanwhile, initiated 136
consultations and were the respondents in 122.100
Most of the consultations concerned anti-
dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, and
safeguards.
Concerning anti-dumping, the countries that have
applied the largest number of measures since 1995
have been India (279), the United States (211), the
European Union (193) and Argentina (193); the
countries against which most measures have been
taken are China (272), the European Union and its
member countries (213) and the Republic of Korea
(110).101
Concerning subsidies and countervailing
measures, 168 investigations were notified during the
period 1995-2003, the largest numbers being conducted
by the United States (69) and the European Union
(42).102 The countries that have applied the largest
number of safeguards, meanwhile, are India (8), the
United States (6) and Chile, the Czech Republic and
the Philippines, with 5 apiece.
As regards compliance with panel or Appellate
Body rulings, the great majority have been complied
with within the reasonable time period stipulated by
article 21.3 of the Understanding.103 The exceptions
have been cases where the parties were in disagreement
and the party ruled in favour of had to apply for DSB
authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations vis-à-vis the offending party. There have
been six such cases since 1995 and the following three
have involved Latin American countries:104
— Actions by the United States, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico and other countries against the
banana import restrictions of the European
Communities.
— Actions by Canada against Brazil for export
financing subsidies in its civil aviation sector.
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i) Costa Rica versus the United States for its
restrictions on textile imports; the ruling went in
favour of Costa Rica.110
ii) Brazil versus the European Communities for
restrictions on poultry imports; the ruling went in
favour of the European Communities.111
iii) Brazil versus Canada for civil aircraft export
subsidies; the ruling went in favour of Brazil.112
iv) Peru versus the European Communities for the
ban on its use of the term “sardines”  in its exports
to the region; the ruling went in favour of Peru.113
v) Brazil versus the European Communities for
application of anti-dumping measures to exports
of steel tubes; the ruling went in favour of
Brazil.114
vi) Argentina versus the United States for application
of anti-dumping measures to imports of Argentine
steel tubes for the oil industry; the ruling went in
favour of Argentina.115
vii) Brazil versus the United States for subsidies to the
cotton industry; the ruling went in favour of
Brazil.116
viii) Antigua and Barbuda versus the United States for
restrictions on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services; the ruling went in
favour of the United States.117
b) Actions by Latin American countries jointly with
other countries
There were five of these actions and all the rulings
went in favour of the complainants:
i) Brazil and Venezuela versus the United States for
its restrictions on gasoline imports.118
ii) Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the
United States against the European Communities
for their restrictions on banana imports.119
105 WTO (2004a, p. 44, paragraph 97).
106 WTO (2004a, p. 44, paragraph 95).
107 www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.html.
108 These 22 rulings include that of 20 April 2005 which settled the
dispute between Antigua and Barbuda and the United States over
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services (Appellate
Body document WT/DS285/AB/R).
109 The exceptions were the action by Brazil against the European
Communities for its restrictions on poultry imports and that of
Antigua and Barbuda against the United States for its cross-border
restrictions on gambling and betting services. The rulings went in
favour of the European Communities and the United States,
respectively.
110 Document WT/DS24/AB/R of 20 March 1997. This document
and others with similar catalogue numbers cited below are Appellate
Body reports.
111 Document WT/DS69/AB/R of 23 July 1998.
112 Document WT/DS70/AB/R of 20 August 1999.
113 Document WT/DS231/AB/R of 23 October 2002.
114 Document WT/DS219/AB/R of 18 August 2003.
115 Document WT/DS268/AB/R of 17 December 2004.
116 Document WT/DS267/AB/R of 21 March 2005.
117 Document WT/DS285/AB/R of 20 April 2005.
118 Document WT/DS2/AB/R of 20 May 1996.
119 Document WT/DS27/AB/R of 25 September 1997.
— Actions by Brazil against Canada for export credits
and loan guarantees in its civil aviation sector.105
1. Consultations
One consequence of the gradual format of the
procedure and the preference for non-contentious
solutions is that a large proportion of consultations
between 1995 and March 2005 ended in agreement
between the parties, without the need to form a panel.
This outcome has been highlighted by the United States
and the European Union as one of the great successes
of the procedure.
Brazil and Argentina have been the main Latin
American users of the consultation procedure. Brazil
has been a complainant in 22 consultations and a
respondent in 12, while Argentina has been a
complainant in 9 and a respondent in 15.106
2. Disputes settled by the Appellate Body
Between 20 May 1996 and 19 May 2005, 68 disputes
were settled by rulings or final reports from the WTO
Appellate Body.107
Approximately one third (22) of these 68 rulings
were on disputes involving Latin American countries
as complainants or respondents,108 and in three of the
22 the disputes were wholly between Latin American
countries. The other 19, therefore, were between Latin
American and non-Latin American countries.
Of these 19 disputes, there were eight in which
the Latin American countries brought their actions
individually and five in which they did so jointly with
other countries.
Latin American countries were respondents in six
disputes.
The details of the disputes are given below.
a) Individual actions by Latin American and
Caribbean countries
These were the eight cases that follow, and the
rulings went in favour of the complainants in all but
two:109
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iii) Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the European Communities
and other countries against the United States for
the so-called Byrd Amendment.120
iv) Brazil, the European Communities and other
countries against the United States for safeguards
on steel imports.121
v) Brazil, Australia and Thailand versus the European
Communities for their sugar subsidies.122
c) Disputes in which Latin American countries were
the respondents
There have been six such disputes and all the
rulings but one have gone against the respondents:
i) Philippines versus Brazil for application of
countervailing measures against imports of
desiccated coconut from the Philippines; the
ruling went in favour of Brazil.123
ii) The United States versus Argentina for application
of duties not included in the schedules of
concessions to imports of footwear and apparel;
the ruling went in favour of the United States.124
iii) Canada versus Brazil for export subsidies to its
civil aviation industry; the ruling went in favour
of Canada.125
iv) European Communities versus Chile for taxes
levied by Chile on imports of alcoholic beverages;
the ruling went in favour of the Communities.126
v) European Communities versus Argentina for
safeguards on footwear imports; the ruling went
in favour of the Communities.127
vi) United States versus Mexico for application of
anti-dumping duties to United States fructose
syrup imports; the ruling went in favour of the
United States.128
d) Disputes between Latin American countries
There were three such disputes:
i) Mexico versus Guatemala for application of
provisional measures to Mexican cement imports;
the ruling went in favour of Guatemala.129
ii) Argentina versus Chile for the price band system
applied to imports of agricultural products; the
ruling went in favour of Argentina.130
iii) Honduras versus the Dominican Republic for the
latter’ s application of a stamp tax to the
importation and sale of cigarettes; the ruling went
in favour of Honduras.131
e) The action by Antigua and Barbuda against the
United States132
This dispute is highlighted here because its subject
matter is quite new (application of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services) and it is among the
latest to have been settled by the Appellate Body.
Furthermore, the action was taken by a very small
country against the most powerful country on the
planet.
Antigua and Barbuda complained about
restrictions applied by the United States to the supply
of betting services and games of chance over the
Internet in general, with particular reference to horse
racing. According to the complainant, the schedule of
market access concessions approved by the United
States133  mentioned “other recreational services” , and
this reference should be understood as including betting
services and games of chance. The United States
rejected this interpretation and stated that this had never
been its intention, since there were three federal laws
in force that prohibited games of chance between states
and even within certain states. The Panel accepted the
complaint, however, because it considered that the
schedule had not explicitly forbidden these services,
and that the United States had not been able to show
that the federal laws invoked fell within the exception
of article XIV a) of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, i.e., that they were “necessary to protect
public morals or to maintain public order” . It also
accepted the complainant’s objection to the Interstate
Horseracing Act, concluding that this discriminated
against providers of remote electronic betting services.
The Appellate Body partially overturned the Panel
resolution. On the one hand, it accepted the defence of
the United States and the legitimacy of the restrictions
laid down by the three federal laws and resolved that120 Document WT/DS217/AB/R of 27 January 2003.
121 Document WT/DS248/AB/R of 10 December 2003.
122 Document WT/DS265/AB/R of 19 May 2005.
123 Document WT/DS22/AB/R of 20 March 1997.
124 Document WT/DS56/AB/R of 22 April 1998.
125 Document WT/DS46/AB/R of 20 August 1999.
126 Document WT/DS110/AB/R of 12 January 2000.
127 Document WT/DS121/AB/R of 12 January 2000.
128 Document WT/DS132/AB/RW of 21 November 2001.
129 Document WT/DS60/AB/R of 25 November 1998.
130 Document WT/DS207/AB/R of 23 October 2002.
131 Document WT/DS302/AB/R of 19 May 2005.
132 Document WT/DS285/AB/R of 20 April 2005.
133 The schedule of market access concessions was approved by the
United States in accordance with article II of GATT, which is one of
the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement.
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these were justified as “necessary to protect public
morals or to maintain public order” . On the other hand,
it upheld the Panel resolution and the complaint of
Antigua and Barbuda that the Interstate Horseracing Act
discriminated against cross-border services supplied
over the Internet. Its conclusion was that the United
States had not succeeded in demonstrating that the
restrictions placed by the Act on foreign providers of
these betting services applied alike to domestic
providers, and it therefore found that the national
treatment rule had been violated, as had article XIV of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services itself.
f) Overall outcome
As the information presented shows, during the
period from May 1996 to May 2005 the overall
outcome (excluding the three disputes between Latin
American countries) is as follows:
— of a total of 19 disputes, the Latin American
countries were the complainants (individually or
jointly with other countries) in 13 cases, and
respondents in 6;
— of their 13 complaints, the Latin American
countries prevailed in 11 and lost 2;
— of the 6 complaints against them, the Latin
American countries lost all but one;
— of the 19 disputes involving Latin American
countries as complainants or respondents, these
countries were successful in 12, i.e., two thirds of
the total, and unsuccessful in 7;
— of the 12 Latin American successes, 8 were
rulings in favour of Brazil. Excluding Brazil,
therefore, the other countries had 4 successes;
— of the 7 Latin American defeats, 2 were rulings
against Brazil. Excluding Brazil, then, the other
countries suffered 5 defeats.
The above figures include the claim by Antigua
and Barbuda against the United States as one of the
defeats, although in some respects the complainant was
successful, as explained above.
VII
The experience of Brazil
1. Summary
Since 1996, Brazil has used the WTO consistently, and
with remarkable success, to resolve its trade disputes.
It was the complainant, jointly with Venezuela, in the
first case to be brought before the WTO (the gasoline
case) and, together with other countries, was also the
complainant in one of the latest cases (the proceedings
against the European Communities for sugar subsidies).
Brazil has participated in 10 disputes before the
WTO. It has been the complainant in 8 cases and lost only
one, while of the 2 in which it has been the respondent,
it lost one. In total, 8 successes and 2 defeats.
Brazil’s two defeats were: in its action against the
European Communities for the latter’s restrictions on
poultry imports, and in the action against it by Canada
for subsidies to its civil aviation industry, which are
mentioned below.
The 10 disputes involving Brazil are shown in
table 1.
2. Description of the disputes involving Brazil
There follows a brief description of the main actions
involving Brazil, as we believe that they are instructive
and important.
a) Brazil and Venezuela versus the United States for
its restrictions on gasoline imports
On 12 April 1995, Brazil complained, jointly with
Venezuela, against the regulations on foreign gasoline
imports approved by the United States. Amendments
to the latter’s Clean Air Act of 1990 established that
only clean or “ reformulated”  gasoline could be sold in
the most polluted metropolitan areas. The complainants
argued that the methodology used by this law was
discriminatory and subjected imported gasoline to less
favourable treatment than domestic gasoline. The
Appellate Body upheld the complaint and resolved that
these regulations represented “unjustifiable discrimination”
and “a disguised restriction on international trade”
prohibited by article XX of GATT 1994, and it ordered
the United States to modify them and bring them into
line with the relevant rules of GATT 1994.134
b) Philippines versus Brazil for countervailing
measures applied to imports of desiccated coconut
Brazil applied provisional and permanent
countervailing measures to imports of desiccated
134 Document WT/DS2/R and DSB resolution of 20 May 1996.
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TABLE 1
Appellate Body resolutions involving Brazil as a party
Outcome







Favourable to Brazil and
others
Favourable to Brazil


















Restrictions on gasoline imports
Countervailing measures on desiccated coconut
imports
Restrictions on poultry imports
Subsidies for aircraft exports
Subsidies for aircraft exports
Byrd amendment (anti-dumping and subsidies
and countervailing measures agreements)
Anti-dumping duties on imports of steel tubes
Subsidies for steel imports
Subsidies for the cotton industry












Fuente: Prepared by the author.
coconut from the Philippines. However, the Appellate
Body declined to consider the Philippines complaint
for formal reasons, as it considered that the country’s
legal justification was erroneous and was not specified
in the relevant mandate.135
c) Brazil versus the European Communities for
restrictions on Brazilian poultry imports
The final resolution of this Brazilian action before
the WTO went against Brazil.
Brazil argued that the European Communities had
not complied fully with their obligation to apply the
tariff rate quota for poultry products established in a
bilateral agreement between the two countries, and had
therefore violated article XXVIII of GATT, which
regulates amendments to schedules of concessions.
Brazil also argued that there had been infringements
of article XIII of GATT, concerning non-discriminatory
application of quantitative restrictions, article X of GATT
on transparency, various provisions of the Agreement
on Import Licensing Procedures between the two
parties, the national treatment rules of GATT and the
135 Document WT/DS22/AB/R and DSB resolution of 20 march 1997.
special safeguard provisions of article 5 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
The Panel, among other considerations, found that
Brazil had not demonstrated that the European
Communities had failed to properly administer the
tariff rate quota for poultry imports. The Panel findings
were appealed but the Appellate Body upheld its
conclusions with some alterations. The two resolutions
were adopted by the DSB on 23 July 1998.136
d) Brazil versus Canada for civil aircraft export
subsidies137
Brazil and Canada had a long-running dispute
over the two countries’  subsidies for their respective
civil aviation industries, since resolved by mutual
agreement between the parties.
There were two main disputes and two subsidiary
ones, the latter arising from the failure to reach
agreement on compliance with the respective rulings
of the Appellate Body.
136 Document WT/DS69/AB/R of 23 July 1998.
137 Document WT/DS70/AB/R of 20 August 1999.
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The complaint brought by Brazil, which was
settled in the country’s favour, will now be described.
Brazil complained against the subsidies provided
by Canada and some of its provinces to the country’s
aircraft industry, arguing that they were prohibited by
articles 3.1 a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. On 14
April 1999, the Panel found that two of the measures
complained of were “contingent in fact upon export
performance”  and thus prohibited by these articles.
The Appellate Body accepted the Brazilian
complaint and ordered the removal of the measures
complained of. Agreement was not reached on
compliance with the ruling, however, so that Brazil
asked for authorization to suspend concessions and
other obligations by means of countermeasures under
articles 22.2 of the Understanding, 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement and VI (6)(a) of GATT for the equivalent of
US$ 3.36 billion. This request was rejected by Canada
and the matter was referred to arbitration under article
22.6 of the Understanding. The arbitration finding
approved the suspension of concessions and the
adoption of “appropriate countermeasures”  but found
that, under article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, the
appropriate sum was US$ 247,797,000, and Brazil was
authorized to implement suspensions for this amount.
Notwithstanding this, the arbitrator ruled that, in
accordance with article 22.8 of the Understanding, the
suspension of concessions and other obligations was
to be temporary and apply only until the prohibited
measure had been removed. The arbitrator also added
that he knew the parties were holding consultations to
arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution and that, given
the circumstances of the case and the wider context,
this seemed to be the most appropriate solution.138
e) Canada versus Brazil for civil aircraft export
subsidies139
This complaint by Canada was against Brazil’s
subsidized financing of the Export Financing
Programme (Programa de Financiamento às
Exportações-PROEX), which promoted civil aircraft
exports, and the panel for this was established on 23
July 1998.
The Appellate Body accepted the complaint that
interest paid under PROEX constituted a subsidy within
the meaning of article 1 of the SCM Agreement. It found
that Brazil had not complied with its obligation under
article 27.4 of that Agreement to “not increase the level
of its export subsidies” . Furthermore, being subsidies
“ contingent upon export performance” , they were
subject to the prohibitions of article 3.1 a) of the same
Agreement. It went on to uphold the panel conclusion
that Brazil had not demonstrated that subsidies to PROEX
had not been used to “secure a material advantage in
the field of export credit terms” .140 In the light of these
considerations it was ruled that Brazil should withdraw
aircraft export subsidies under PROEX, and this was
upheld by the DSB on 20 August 1999.
Since no agreement was reached on compliance
by Brazil with the ruling, Canada requested the
formation of a panel under article 21.5 of the
Understanding, and this was established on 9
December 1999. In its report, the Panel concluded that
Brazil had not brought PROEX into conformity with the
SCM Agreement. Brazil appealed and also requested
arbitration141 to determine the justification for the
countermeasures requested by Canada. The Appellate
Body confirmed the Panel finding that Brazil had not
brought PROEX into conformity with the SCM Agreement,
and this was upheld by the DSB on 4 August 2000.
The arbitrators ruled that Canada would be
justified in applying countermeasures of up to 344
million Canadian dollars a year for six years and
suspending concessions for that amount. This was
upheld by the DSB on 12 December 2000. On that same
date, Brazil notified the DSB of the changes made to
PROEX and argued that it was now in conformity with
the SCM Agreement. Canada disagreed, however, and
made a second application for a panel under article 21.5
of the Understanding. This time the Panel concluded
that the revisions made by Brazil to PROEX III were not
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, and this finding
was upheld by the DSB on 23 August 2001.
f) Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the European Communities
and other countries versus the United States over
the Byrd Amendment142
The United States legislation of 2000 known as
the Byrd Amendment amended a 1930 Tariff Act and
allowed import duties collected by the Treasury under
anti-dumping and countervailing duties legislation to
be transferred to the businesses that had reported
breaches of this legislation.
138 See articles VIII and III of the WTO Agreement.
139 Document WT/DS46/AB/R of 20 August 1999.
140 See Annex I of the SCM Agreement.
141 For the concept of arbitration, see section III, point 7 above.
142 Brazil was one of a number of complainants. This reference is
to the Brazilian claim only.
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The Appellate Body found that this Amendment
was a specific anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measure
that was not permitted by and was contrary to the AD
and SCM Agreements. It found that the United States
had violated those Agreements and article XVI (4) of
the WTO Agreement which obliges Member countries
to ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative
procedures are consistent with their obligations under
multilateral covered agreements. By committing these
infractions, it found, the United States had nullified or
impaired the benefits conferred upon the complainants
by those agreements.
The parties were unable to agree on the measures
to be adopted by the United States to comply with the
ruling, and Brazil requested authorization to suspend
tariff concessions and obligations under GATT 1994; this
was submitted to arbitration. The resolution adopted
established that Brazil could suspend concessions by
levying additional import duties on a definitive
schedule of products originating in the United States.
This schedule would cover, each year, a total trade
value no greater than the amount yielded by a particular
equation. This would take into account the amount of
reimbursements under the Byrd Amendment during the
last year for which data were available on the anti-
dumping or countervailing duties paid by Brazil that
year, multiplied by a coefficient calculated to ensure
that the level of suspension would be equivalent to that
of the nullification or impairment of the benefits
conferred upon Brazil by the breached agreements.143
The United States reported that on 3 March 2005 a bill
repealing the Byrd Amendment had been submitted to
the House of Representatives.144
g) Brazil versus the European Communities over
anti-dumping duties on malleable cast iron tube
or pipe fittings from Brazil
Brazil made a complaint against the European
Communities for infringing the AD Agreement by
applying anti-dumping duties to these imports. Chile
reserved its third-party rights and formulated
observations on the ruling.
The Appellate Body ruled that the Communities
had violated articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD Agreement
by not providing Brazilian exporters, during the
investigation of the anti-dumping claims, with the
information they had available on the factors listed in
article 3.4 of that Agreement affecting the domestic
industry concerned. Since these economic factors and
indicators influenced the state of the domestic industry
affected by the dumping, Brazilian exporters were
unable to mount a proper defence during that
investigation. The Appellate Body ruled in favour of
Brazil because it considered that the timely provision
of this information by the European Communities was
an essential part of the process and that the failure to
provide it could not be remedied after the event.
h) Brazil, the European Communities and other
countries versus the United States over safeguards
on steel imports
The European Communities, Brazil and other
countries made a complaint against the safeguards
applied to steel imports by the United States on the
grounds that they had violated articles XIX (1) (a) of
GATT 1994 and 3.1 of the SG Agreement. The claim was
based on the alleged failure by the United States to
provide an adequate and detailed explanation of the
“unforeseen developments”  leading to such increased
quantities of imports in such amounts as to cause
serious injury to the relevant domestic producers.
The Appellate Body accepted the complaints and
added that the application of safeguards to certain steel
products was inconsistent with the requirements of
articles 2.1 and 3.1 of the SG Agreement, since the
United States did not explain the grounds for its
determination concerning the rise in imports. The Body
also judged it to be inconsistent with articles 2.1 and
4.2 of the SG Agreement, in that the United States did
not comply with the requirement of “ parallelism”
between the products for which the safeguards were
established and the products to which the measures
were applied.145 The Appellate Body recommended,
and the DSB agreed, that the measures objected to
should be brought into conformity with the provisions
of the SG Agreement, and on 4 December 2003 the
White House announced that these measures were to
be lifted146
i) Brazil versus the United States over cotton industry
subsidies
The complaint by Brazil against the United States
over subsidies to the latter’ s cotton industry was
143 Document WT/DS217/AB/R of 31 August 2004.
144 Information on the DSB of 21 March 2005, in WTO (2005).
145 Document WT/DS251/AB/R and DSB resolution of 10 December
2003.
146 www.whitehouse.gov.newsrelease.
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accepted by the Appellate Body and approved by
the DSB on 21 March 2005. The finding was that the
payments and support provided by the United States
to that industry, put at over US$ 3 billion a year,
violated the Agreement on Agriculture, the SCM
Agreement and GATT 1994. They constituted a form of
“support to a specific commodity”  prohibited by the
Agreement on Agriculture, and those provided during
1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 exceeded the amounts
provided in 1992 and were subject to the actions of
articles 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement and XVI (1) of
GATT 1994. Furthermore, they undervalued domestic
prices and were thus harmful to imported products,
infringing article 6 (2) (ii), and were prohibited
subsidies under the terms of articles 3.1 (b) and 3.2 of
the SCM Agreement, respectively. The credits and
guarantees provided were judged to be subsidies
contingent upon export performance, and thus also
illegal under the SCM Agreement. The conclusion was
that the measures referred to were not compatible with
the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement
and that they should be brought into conformity with
the provisions of these agreements.
j) Brazil, Australia and Thailand versus the European
Communities over their subsidies to the sugar
industry (2005)
One peculiarity of this dispute was that besides
the parties directly involved, a total of 22 countries
reserved third-party rights, including China, Canada,
the United States, India and sugar-producing countries
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. These latter
groups of countries, known as “ACP countries” , receive
financial support from the European Communities.
The complainants argued that the subsidies
granted to the sugar industry by the European
Communities were above the limits specified in the
respective schedules of concessions, and that this
violated the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM
Agreement. In particular, the complainants argued that
the European Communities guaranteed a high price for
sugar included in the respective production quotas, but
that sugar in excess of these quotas, known as “C sugar” ,
could not be sold internally but had to be exported. The
high prices paid to producers and processors enabled
these to finance the production and export of C sugar at
prices lower than the cost of production. Furthermore,
it was argued that the Communities provided export
subsidies to approximately 1.6 million tons, with a value
equivalent to that of the imports received from the ACP
countries. Because the values and volumes of these
exports exceeded the limits committed to and agreed,
the subsidies of the European Communities breached
the relevant provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture and the SCM Agreement.147
The Panel resolution accepted the complainants’
arguments, and it was upheld by the Appellate Body.
The infractions by the European Communities were
ruled to have nullified or impaired the benefits that the
Agreement on Agriculture conferred upon the
complainants and it was recommended that the
Communities amend their rules on sugar and bring
them into compliance with the provisions of that
Agreement.
147 Article 3.3, article 8 and article 9.1 a) and c) or, alternatively,
article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and article I, part 1.1,
points a) 1) i) and a) 1) iv) and points a) 2) and b) of the SCM
Agreement.
148 A good example of the successful use of diplomacy to settle or
prevent disputes were the negotiations undertaken by Chile to prevent




While governments should always give priority to
diplomacy for resolving their trade conflicts with other
countries,148 the virtue of the WTO procedure is that its
consultations often yield quite similar solutions. The
information analysed shows that when consultations
fail and disputes are referred for a panel ruling, the
results have usually gone in favour of the Latin
American countries. This must be put down to the
predictability of the procedure and the fact that it is
administered by independent tribunals that objectively
apply and interpret rules agreed at a multilateral level.
Given that the disputes concerned are exclusively
between States, but concern and affect private-sector
interests, it is vital for governments to coordinate
closely with domestic exporters and importers. This
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coordination should be ongoing rather than arising as
an ad hoc response to a particular dispute. Its aim should
be preventive, so that problems can be anticipated and
the necessary measures or courses of action taken. It is
usually foreign affairs or trade ministries, or both, that
represent the interests of States before the WTO in these
matters. Nonetheless, the complex technical nature of
these issues means that governments need specialist
professional back-up, particularly in the legal area, if
they are to deal with them properly. One option that
many countries, particularly weaker ones, should
consider before initiating or responding to a complaint
is to seek advice from the Advisory Centre on WTO Law
in Geneva, referred to earlier, as its charges are far
lower than any international law firm’s.
The pattern of jurisprudence over the last 10 years
means that the results of disputes can be predicted, at
least in some matters, and countries need to study it
carefully before presenting a complaint. Sometimes,
however, domestic political factors trigger hasty
reactions whose sole object is to placate local public
opinion or respond to pressure, some of it ill-advised,
from the private-sector industry affected. Not only do
these reactions generally prove unfruitful, but their
ultimate effect is invariably to undermine the credibility
of governments, and they should always be resisted.
There are two options that Latin American
governments ought to consider.
One is to participate fairly frequently as interested
third parties in disputes that affect their interests, even
if only indirectly. This kind of participation does not
involve large costs and it enables governments to
familiarize themselves with the procedures and
workings of the system, and thereby acquire the
experience they need to cope successfully with future
disputes before the WTO.
The other option is for governments to consider
joining forces with other countries, particularly OECD
ones, in large-scale disputes. When they have done so,
the results have usually been favourable. Examples of
this include the following complaints: Ecuador, the
United States and other countries versus the European
Communities over restrictions on banana imports;
Brazil, the European Communities and other countries
versus the United States over tariffs levied on steel
imports; and Brazil, Chile, Mexico and the European
Communities over the Byrd Amendment. The results
of all these cases went in favour of the complainants,
and it is possible that this would not have happened
had the Latin American countries acted alone.
(Original: Spanish)
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